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WHAT CONSERVATIVE SOCIAL JUSTICE MEANS TO ME
MICHAEL BOULETTE*
To be conservative, then, is to prefer the familiar to the
unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the
actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the
distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the
perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss.'
The question posed by the editorial board is, in fact, twofold. It must
first be determined what conservatism is, and only then can we begin to
comment on a properly conservative conception of social justice. This
essay will attempt to answer both questions. The essay will first argue for a
truly conservative conservatism, a conservatism dedicated to preserving our
vital social traditions, and a traditional protectivism against the tide of
progressive social thought.' Next, the essay will suggest a definition of
social justice consistent with this notion of conservatism. Accordingly, the
essay will argue that true conservative social justice must concern itself
with the preservation and perfection of our traditions-individual
enterprise, limited government, and personal responsibility.
The epigraph to this essay presents an understanding of conservatism
somewhat different from our modem Republican-Democrat paradigm.
Conservatism presents itself as disposition rather than ideology.3
Conservatism, as I understand it, is a preference for practical and traditional
politics. It values the gains of centuries more than the supposed
improvements of a Congressional session-what has been hard-won over
history to utopian social engineering.4
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This is not to equate conservatism with a blind adherence to tradition-
truth is not established by pedigree. However, conservatism, so conceived,
does presuppose that institutions that have withstood the erosive effects of
time ought not be lightly cast aside. This conservatism suggests that our
traditions-correctly understood-embody moral truths, even if only
imperfectly.5 Thus, conservatism finds no need to conflate a plurality of
political and social traditions with the absence of normative morality-
recognizing that variance in tradition need not translate to the absence of
truth. Instead, this conservatism understands that the same truth permits
varying presentations across cultures and traditions, and that these truths
can be comprehended only in the context of individual traditions (lest they
become axioms without application). These traditions are the means by
which we instantiate truth in our lives and in our souls; they are the vehicles
through which we transmit truth across the generations. In short, moral
truth finds its truest expressions in our traditions, and it is conservatism that
serves moral truth by respecting and protecting humanity's connection to it.
Consequently, if we are to understand conservative social justice, we
must look to our traditions and their connection to normative truths. It is
undeniable that our tradition is a liberal one-a tradition that devotes itself
to liberty, to the primacy of individual freedom over and above attempts at
social planning and leveling. The tradition of our nation-accepting all its
diversity-is one that values the rights of individuals over the force of the
majority, personal initiative over government grant, local responsibility
over federal prescription. We are a people apt to trust our neighbor before
our government and more accepting of individual folly than government
arranged perfection. Admittedly there is no single conception of the
American ethos, but surely a spirit of liberty prevails in our history and our
hearts.
Conservatism, as I have described it, accepts that there is something of
value in these traditions, something worth protecting in the American way
of life. Conservatives cut of this cloth believe that there are certain truths of
individual liberty and responsibility uniquely instantiated in the American
tradition, and that these truths must be protected or be lost. They must be
fought for against the tides of social progressivism, egalitarian leveling, and
radical utopianism.
Thus, we are finally left with the original question "what is
conservative social justice," and in many ways the answer is implicit in
what has already been said. Conservative social justice-or more properly
American conservative social justice-founds itself in a respect for the
individual, in a reverence for liberty and, particularly American, liberty. As
a result, conservative social justice levels a series of commands; it calls
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conservatives to action both politically and personally. Conservative social
justice demands individual responsibility, decries buck-passing, and
requires all individuals to make themselves deserving of the freedom their
tradition has bestowed upon them.
It follows from this that to protect our freedom we must respect each
other. We must always prefer individual charity to government welfare
(and become practitioners of that charity). We must balance our traditional
freedom with moral obligation, and in so doing become worthy of that
freedom. In politics, we must value the imperfect truths of our tradition as
the fruit of centuries, while, as individuals, continuing to strive and perfect.
We must practice public restraint and individual magnanimity. We are
limited politicians, but limitless individuals.
In addition, conservatives shoulder the responsibility of reminding our
fellow citizens of the value of the American tradition. We must remind
Americans of both the value and fragility of their traditional liberty. As
such, conservatives cannot relegate themselves to the task of preservation-
acting as the guards of ancient tomes-we must live out our tradition and
embody its values. We must speak its language and strive to supplement its
deficiencies. Conservatives must be conservationists, not historians.
To conclude, the foregoing essay has attempted to briefly suggest a
particular vision of conservatism and its implications for social justice.
Understandably there will be some who disagree. This is not a
conservatism founded upon natural law; it looks for earthly and not
heavenly truths.6 This is not a conservatism inspired by theistic faith
(although it could be). And this is not a conservatism that necessarily
concerns itself with an opposition to gay marriage, overturning Roe v.
Wade,7 or preserving family values. However, it is conservative insofar as
it strives for continuity, insofar as it seeks to conserve the gains of
centuries, and it is in that conservation that conservative social justice lives.
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